A further note on labour migration by Harris, John R. & Mitchell, Frank
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribuiion-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecornmons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, NAIROBI J D S IUFT1M>V' 
RPSFnVE C'O; i 
Discussion Paper No. 80. 
A FURTHER NOTE ON LABOUR MIGRATION 
i " 
• ; tlViU, 
John R. Harris and Frank Mitchell 
July, 1 9 6 9 
Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author^. 
They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of 
the Institute for Development Studies or of the Univertity 
College, Nairobi. 


zx > arid average and ©arginal products on the Y-axis. 
Total skilled labour available is OS.. The curve M^ » (f g. ) 
h 
is the marginal produot of skilled labour employed at hoei© 
and the curve Q/L is average domestic output ^ pMDu&OBMBbfeac 
jao&m&per domestically employed (skilled and unskilled) worker. 
This curve (which seems to b® the aame as MVW in M & Iea 
Figure 1} reaob.es its maximum at E (corresponding to 1 in H 
& I ( F i g u r e 1) where marginal and avarage dgmeatio 
product are equal* inooise per domestically employed 
* 
worker, differs from Q/L by the amount of remittances* 
received per domestically employed worker (r/l). The 
curve R/L baa been drawn under the assumption that the 
marginal remittance (Mr) :ie constant. Then the curve V can 
be drawn by adding S/L and q/L. It reaches its maximum 
where it intersects the curve M -M (drawn by subtracting 
the constant marginal remittance curve K^ fro® the M^ ourve) 
at point F. Thus the optimum amount of domestic employment 
of skilled labour is OA and emigration is equal to AS. 
The marginal product of skilled labour at- this point is AC, 
marginal remittance is FG (not OB as M & I suggest), 
average domestic product is AB, average remittance is. AG «* 
BF, and average inooae per domestically employed worker ia 
maximised at level AF. 
If there were no remittances, then the optimal employ-
ment of skilled labour would be OBj domestic product and 
income per domestically employed worker- would he equal to 
BE and marginal and average products would be equated. 
(This condition® ie obvious from equation J), Thue the 
existence of remittances increases the optimal level of emig-
ration. 
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Figur« 
V M r 
Q/L + Hfij 
Ski lied Labour Employed at Home ( S h ) — £ ^ — S k i l l e d emigrants ( S—Sn,) 
K & f olai® to draw three comparative » ststie 
; fro® the analysis»noo® of which is necessarily 
true. 
First, they claim lfthe.t the optimal level of 
migration is an increasing function of the level of marginal 
remittances." (p'» 333)® While this result is the most 
plausible empirically it need not bo true. This ease can 
to® analysed by considering a change in a such that g ^ ^ Q 
— the marginal remittance rate is increased. Assuming that' 
condition (7) has boen solved for the optimal 3 ® 8^* it 
can be implictily differentiatedto obtain the result * 
s * % + U) ( } 
dS?/dsj • 
The second order condition for a maximum requires that 
d^/dS? < 0. Hence > rt 1 ^ - < n h
 7 ± r 0 T v u j * ^ o. 
Since g,„ '> 0S dS. 0 if g > G. This is the result a a < — 
jpMitM * da 
posited by M & Y-—• inoreased marginal remittance lead© to 
more migration* However, it i& clear that if g^ ie 
sufficiently negative — that is that the average remittance 
falls even though marginal rises higher marginal remittances 
will be associated with a smaller optimum level of migration. 
This is quite clear from our figure 1« Higher marginal 
remittances at the previous optimum (P), lowers the M, - M. 
curve at that point. If ¥ remains constant or shifts up, 
the maximum point on F must move to the left. However, if 
¥ shifts down (because the R/L shifts down) the maximum 
point can move to the right. This will occur only if the 
M ourve "twists'1 so that marginal remittances falls at 
lower levels while they rise at higher level® of migration. 
M & T!s second proposition is wif th® aarginai remit-
t e e wrvo is horisent&l, the optl»al level of skilled 
employment will be independent of the else of the total labour 
foroe, as can be seen fro® equation (7) or Figure l w. (p«333)« 
This result cannot be seen fro® either their equation (7) 
/"our equation. (8). / nor from their figure 1 as asserted* 
la fact the statement ia wrong. 
There ere several Kays in which the labour foroe oan 
be ohangsd. , 
1. Assume the total labour foroe iu changed by altering 
the value of Implicitly differentiating the condition 
for maximua 1 (7), - (Simplifying and assuming that the 
seoand order condition for maximum ¥ holds (d^?/dSha< 0), 
we find dSt . . . -J* % 0 as V + f«i TT(S. 4- U) t f ,lnv dU T u vXOJ 
whsra is the level of skilled employment at which ¥ 
is maximised. Hence? the slop© of the marginal resittanoe 
ourvs doss not affect the direction of change of the optimal 
skilled labour foroe employed at home when tho unskilled 
labour foroe ohanges. Howevers the optiisuis horn© employed 
skilled labour foro® does depend on the number of unskilled 
parsons employed, independent of that slope, contra the state-
ment citod above« 
It is worth providing some interpretation of (10). 
Sine© in general f * (that is, the marginal product of. 
unskilled labour- will be less than the average product of 
skilled and unskilled labour plus average remittances), and 
f > Gj (that isj, skilled and unskilled labour are oomple-
h » * 
mentary inputs) it follows that > affect 
dU 
of an increase in the totael unskilled labour foroe will be to 
reduce the optimal amount of emigration* 
That is, an increase in the skilled labour force will 
result in a smaller amount of skilled labour being employed 
at home. This is obvious from the diagram. The increase 
in the skilled labour force will leave the M. - M curve h r 
unaffected (assuming a constant marginal remittance rate), 
but iJ/ U ;*na hence V will shift up fox each amount of sicillec 
labour employed, because of a higher n--.mber of emigrants, an; 
Mia xnteraeotion of the two will shift to the left. 
3. What will happen when the labour force expands throng: 
proportional expansion of both skilled and unskilled labour'. 
That 3 and U rise in proportion can be described by 
S - a.U, (12) 
where 'a* is some constant. Substituting .this expression 
into the system, we again implicitly differentiate ('') and 
find that » 
If-1" i 0 U«5hV ~ agjgg) ( L ) + V >fu + agE( (13) 
assuming a constant marginal remittance rate (g.,„ » 0), a fclhi 
comparison with (10) shows that while it remains likely that 
home employment of skilled laDour will rise, it is somewhat 
Referring to our diagram, an increase \n U will tsail' 
Mj, and M^- M . up, and will reduce V on the assumption that 
unskilled laoourere have a lower marginal product than the 
average product of all labour<. Hence, the intersection 
of these curves, which represents the optimum, will shift 
to the right, 'meaning that mora skilled labour will be 
held at home. 
2, What happens when only the amount of skilled labour 
increases ? Implicitly differentiating \7), we find 
d Bh * SS 
dS ___ L-1 Q f, ^  ^  
d2V/d „ 2 
lesa likely than whors unskilled labour alone increases 
because of the term ag^• As in that case, the rise in 
unskilled labour will raise the marginal product of skilled 
labour, tending to lead to greater employment of skilled 
laoour at home. However, this effect is counterbalanced 
to some extent by a rise in the r/l curve, as occurred in 
case 2 when only skilled labour rose. 
Ti roc-re interesting to ask whether^ when skilled and 
ur.skilied labour forces expand proportionally, home skilled 
employment will rise mere than in proportion to the 'growth 
of the labour farce, The condition for a rise in the 
proportion of skilled tc unskilled labour employed .at home 
is found by implicitly differentiating {f)f still assuming 
(12). After simplifying, the condition can be written as 
a |,t^ 'vr1 ~ 0 as L. f „ + V £ ag., - f e . L + f ., , v dlo6 V dU Sh shU < ua5 s ^ ^ u {lA j 
when g.^ -, « 0. There is no simple in terpretation of the 
condition but it is readily seen that it will depend heavily 
on the relative magnitudes of f_, and fr, m, ® 3.3. S, U« The stronger h h h 
the degree of diminishing returns to skilled labour, (f, o, o h n 
< 0 and large in absolute value) and the lesfe oomplsmen-
tary are skilled and unskilled labour ir; production (f„ TI > 0 
but small) the greater will be the optimal proportion"of 
skilled labour emigrating. 
Of one thing we can be cei'tain, howeveri the amount of 
SK.il.led employment at home will in general not be independent 
of jbfcfifMx of the labour force when the marginal remittance 
curve is held constant* 
The third proposition that M & Y claim to derive from 
the model is that "the optimal level of migration will be less 
if the objective is to maximize income per total population 
(including emigrants).M (footnote 2 p. 333). This proposi-
tion too is wrong. The opposite can be shown to be true, 
we can formalise this version of the model with the following 
equationsi 
Q - f(sh, U) (1) 
T » t(E) (15) 
E - (3) 
Z - Q+T (16) 
H » 3 + U (17) 
Q + T • W * Z/K - f - ^ j (lb) 
where T is total earnings of emigrants and N is the total 
citizen population residing both at nomeand abroad. $ is 
then the average income of all citizens and the objective 
of the system is to maximize W. Note that remittances in 
this model are merely transfers between individuals who are 
equally weighted in the implicit welfare function. The 
condition for a maximum of W ie? 
ii »f 
f£,. is starred to distinguish the optimal marginal product 
of skilled labour when W is maximized compared with when V 
is maximised. The condition is obvious — migration takes 
place until marginal earnings of sxilled labour is equated 
between home and foreign employment "*. a ill maximization 
of W result in more or less migration than maximization of 
V ? tf© can find the answer by comparing the optima 
represented by equations (8) and (13) fiawriting, 
\ - V - g s - 0 (8) 
f " t E 53 0 1 
- 1 0 
and subtracting (19) from (8) we find 
(f ) - V + e B - v V - (Mt - M r) (20) 
h h 
where Mt is the marginal earnings abroad of an emigrant. 
The second term on the right hand side of (20) retained 
(Mt - Mr) is the marginal^earnings of emigrants. Thus the * 
sign of f„ - f 0 depends on whether or not the retained 
earnings 'abroad of emigree<3 is greater or less than the 
average income of all persons remaining at home. Recalling 
that all emigrees are skilled workers while the income at 
home is averaged over the mass of unskilled workers, it 
seems plausible to impose the condition V - (M, ~ M )< 0. t r 
This is indeed a rather weak behavioural constraint, 
skilled workers will only migrate if their standard of 
living (retained income) abroad is at least as high as 
the average income of all residents of the home country* 
If this condition is imposed, then it follows that f„ * 3, - of n h 
which implies that optimal migration will be greater if 
the welfare (income) of emigrants is taken into account. 
This result sheds some light on the question of whether 
developing countries need to restrict free emigration. The 
answer depends on whether or not welfare of citizens living 
abroad enters the country's welfare function• If it dees-
- J 
and migration of skilled labour takes place so long as 
earnings ar« higher abroad, equation (19) demonstrates 
that free migration will maximize such a welfare function. 
On the other hand, according to condition (20) free migration 
will result in average income of residents of the country 
being lower than it would be if migration were restricted. 
Thus if only income of residents is important to the 
governments some restriction of migration will be desirable. 
'This is, of course, a very simple model. A complete svalua 
tion of the desirability of migration restriction would have i 
to include considerations of the effects of emigration on 
capital accumulation and appropriate allocation of invest-
ment between physical arid human capital, as ifell as on 
intangible but important considerations such as respect for 
liberty of the individual. 
Finally, we would like to point out that Kiohalopoulos 
conclusion on the optimal siae of population when the 
marginal product of labour abroad exceeds the maximum 
average product of labour at homo is incorrect. Our 
Figure 2 reproduces his Figure 2, in which AP is the average 
product of labour (or average per capita income if we 
assume that the labour/population ratio is fixed) in 
country B, MP is the marginal product of labour in 
country B, and YY is the marginal product of labour in 
country A and labour is assumed to be homogeneous. Accord! 
to iiichalopoulos, "if there ware no restrictions to 
migration, there would be an incentive for B's workers 
to emigrate until only GJ remained in BM (p. 136). This 
is clearly incorrect, for while the 'marginal product® of 
labour in B equals the marginal product in A, it is 
impossible (without subsidies from abroad, which are 
excluded from the analysis) that labourers in B will be 
paid this marginal product* Indeed, if the whole domestic 
product of B is paid to labour, the average earnings of 
labour® will come to only JM, which is less than what t&sey ' 
could earn abroad. In the circumstances shown, the 
optimal population in B will bo nil - the case of Antarctica 
Perhaps it is worthwhile commenting a little more full, 
upon the use of the diagram, since similar confusions can 
arise in the analysis of other problems. There are two 
1 2 -
basic arguments which might he need to justify the upward t 
eloping marginal and average product segments, First, a 
variable proportions argument that the amount of land, 
capital, technology, etc. is held fixed and that if very 
small amounts of labour are applied to this fixed quant it.,-
of complementary resources, the marginal ( and average ) 
products of labour will rise over some range.- On the 
assumption of a constant returns to scale production 
function, the marginal products of the fixed factors will 
he negative in this range. Insofar as it is possible 
for the economy to apply its labour to only some of these-
resources (which seems empire cally reasonable since most 
countries of the world, including even the poorest, contatr-. 
some unused land, mineral deposits, etc.), the relevant 
average product of labour will be given by NR (corresponding 
to the highest average product of labour) up to labour 
input 03, beyond which the curves are as shown by Miob&lopouK . 
Figure 
Labouv Woree (or PopuIa tion) 
Second, what if the upward rising segments of the 
marginal and av ©rage product curves are exnlsinsd by ? 
"•increasing returns to the size of the economy"? There 
s|?q several stories which could be told to account for this, 
I however, they all have ia common the notion that output per 
I 
handle of resources will rise as the economy expands« If 
tjhe economy consists of atomistic decision. - making units, • 
fib-one will find it worthwhile to take this relationship into 
fipoount in making his decisions. The relationship will be 
external to firms (and labourers), but internal to the 
economy, (The common analogy would be the Marshallian | 
analysis of economies external to the firm, but internal, 
tjb the industry). 
In this case, the MP curve wil.1 indicate the increment 
output which will be-; associated with increasing the labour 
w W e by one unit (where the labour for;;© is exogenouely 
I 
determined; •  who:i the :-mou»ts of all other factor's adjust 
lib the new ao-ount or '} • >uu". aooor&ing to the "economic laws" L 
the econo my under •.:•(> dilution. Its relationship to 
observed loous of output/].:::hour points will depend 
vjpon the nature of those 4 G u r v® i s 
iff praotioaL relevv aov if .r^  urn® a c«at:t'?..l decision -
ilaker who c-...n control tho j.-io-.ur supply (through birth 
(jontrol and health programed", immigration and emigration 
qjbntrol s etc. ).' 
v 5 
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